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Sovereign Immunity-ELEVENTH AMENDMENT-STATE EMPLOYEE
BARRED FROM FEDERAL COURT SUIT UNDER FAIR LABOR STANDARDS
ACT
Employees of Department of Public Health and
Welfare v. Department of Public Health
and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973)
[The] pattern of citizen against state brings sharply into focus
two conflicting policies which are deeply imbedded in our judicial
system. One is the established practice of providing a federal
forum for the vindication of federal rights; the other is the policy
of shielding the sovereign from suit. The former has a basis in
logic, the latter only in history.'
The recent United States Supreme Court case, Employees of
Department of Public Health and Welfare v. Department of Public Health
and Welfare,2 highlights the above conflict and demonstrates the
tension which results when a common law doctrine, a product of a
unitary system, is applied to a federal form of government.
Employees of the Missouri Department of Public Health and
Welfare brought suit against the Department under the Fair Labor
Standards Act3 demanding overtime compensation and a like
amount of liquidated damages and legal fees. Their complaint was
dismissed by the district court on the grounds that the court could
not entertain a suit against an unconsenting state.4 A three-judge
panel of the Eighth Circuit reversed the ruling of the district court,
but on rehearing en banc the Eighth Circuit set aside the panel's
decision and affirmed the dismissal.5 The case reached the United
States Supreme Court on a writ of certiorari6 and again the
dismissal was affirmed. 7
Department of Public Health represents the most recent attempt
by the Supreme Court to resolve the inevitable dilemma resulting
from the clash between federally guaranteed rights and the
sovereignty of the states.
' 49 VA. L. REv. 604, 609 (1963).
2 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
3 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1970).
4 The decision of the district court is unpublished.
5 452 F.2d 820 (8th Cir. 1972).
6 405 U.S. 1016 (1972).
7 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
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I
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Sovereign immunity has its common law origin in the notion
that "the King can do no wrong."' Stated in a more authoritarian
fashion,
[a] sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal
conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical
ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority
that makes the law on which the right depends.9
Clearly, the concept is best understood when viewed as a bulwark
of an absolutist state. Many writers have maintained that sovereign
immunity is today an anachronism, totally incompatible with mod-
ern notions of justice and governmental responsibility.' 0 On the
state level the doctrine has eroded in recent-years."
8 A great deal of historical material is available on the subject of sovereign immunity.
See, e.g., C. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY (1972). Almost
any treatment of American constitutional history includes at least a general overview of the
subject. See generally M. IRISH & J. PROTHRO, THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 128-29
(1968); A. McLAUGHLIN, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 301-03 (1935);
1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 91-102 (1922). Additionally,
some shorter works give the doctrine a deeper examination. See, e.g., Cullison, Interpretation
of the Eleventh Amendment (A Case of the White Knight's Green Whiskers), 5 HOUSTON L. REv. 1
(1967); Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1963); Mathis, The Eleventh Amendment. Adoption and Interpretation, 2 GA. L. REV. 207 (1968);
Note, The Sovereign Immunity of the States: The Doctrine and Some of its Recent Developments, 40
MINN. L. REv. 234 (1956).
9 Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907).
10 Hardly a voice is raised in defense of sovereign immunity. Most commonly, the
doctrine is assailed as a remnant of a now dead authoritarian past which produced results
anathema to contemporary notions of justice and reason. One critic has stated: "[I]t is
doubtful that the outdated and archaic concept of sovereign immunity contributes anything
of value to the administration of justice between the states and their citizens in the twentieth
century." Note, supra note 8, at 264. The concept is not seen as effectuating any valid
policies; rather it is viewed as an obstruction. One writer speaks of the need for remedies to
be available free from "entanglement in eleventh amendment technicalities." 17 VILL. L.
REv. 713, 722 (1972).
In earlier days, governmental activity was limited. Today, however, various levels of
government affect nearly every aspect of our daily lives. Therefore, it is suggested, govern-
mental immunity no longer is justified. See Note, Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. State Docks
Dep't: The Passing of Sovereign Immunity, 69 DICK. L. REv. 270, 283 (1965).
A perceptible weakening of support for the defense of sovereign immunity can be
traced in recent court decisions. See Mathis, supra note 8; Comment, Private Suits Against
States in the Federal Courts, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 331 (1966); Note, The Present Status of the
Eleventh Amendment, 10 VAND. L. REv. 425 (1957); 45 IoWA L. REv. 621 (1960); 49 VA. L.
REV. 604 (1963).
" Both state legislatures and courts have placed restrictions on the state's ability to
evade suit. In the first instance, private bills in the legislature provided a loophole by
granting an appropriation or allowing a court suit. See Note, supra note 8, at 239-40. More
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Sovereign immunity was widely accepted by the "Founding
Fathers";1 2 their intent was that the doctrine would be read into
article III of the Constitution. Although the language of article III
provides in part that the judicial power of the United States shall
extend "to Controversies . . . between a State and Citizens of
another State . . . and between a State . . . and foreign States,
Citizens or Subjects,"'13 Alexander Hamilton suggested the senti-
ment of the time in The Federalist:
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable
to the suit of an individual without its consent. This is the general
sense and the general practice of mankind; and the exemption,
as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the
government of every State in the Union. 4
The doctrine of sovereign immunity as understood by the
Founders, was a composite of two separate issues: (1) the rule of
"domestic sovereign immunity," providing that a state could not be
sued in its own courts without its consent; and (2) the rule of
"foreign sovereign immunity," which held that a state could also
not be sued in the courts of a foreign nation without its consent.15
However, the engrafting of these traditional notions of sovereign
immunity into a federal system created a dilemma not encountered
by common law juries brought up in a unitai-y system. 16
recently, states have enacted laws permitting actions for money judgments within certain
limitations. Id. at 262-63.
The status of sovereign immunity in each of the 50 states is briefly outlined in Hamill,
The Changing Concept of Sovereign Immunity, 13 DEFENSE L.J. 653, 664-76 (1964). The
movement away from state government immunity in tort is discussed in Mosk, The Many
Problems of Sovereign Liability, 3 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 7 (1966), while Hink & Schutter, Some
Thoughts on the American Law of Governmental Tort Liability, 20 RUTGERS L. REv. 710, 728-47
(1966), examines the experience of selected states.
12 See generally note 8 supra.
13 U.S. CONST. art. III.
14 THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 511 (B. Wright ed. 1966) (A. Hamilton) (emphasis in
original). But cf. C. JACOBS, supra note 8, at 36-37.
15 See Note, Awarding Attorney and Expert Witness Fees in Environmental Litigation, 58
CORNELL L. REV. 1232, 1246-47 (1973).
16 One commentator has remarked: "Why this English theory of sovereign immunity,
an immunity originally personal to the King, came to be applied to the United States is one
of the mysteries of legal evolution." H. STREET, GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY 8 (1953).
There is a dearth of evidence on the question whether the common law jurists ever
recognized the potential conflict between federalism and the notion of sovereign immunity.
The standard work, W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1926), sheds no light on
the subject. C. KINNANE, A FIRST BOOK ON ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 467-519 (2d ed. 1952),
discusses the impact of the common law on the structures of both the state and the federal
court systems but never touches directly on this question. Similarly, R. JOHNSTON, THE
EFFECT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW ON FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN AUSTRALIA, CANADA, AND THE
UNITED STATES (1969), although affording worthwhile comparisons of three systems based
in the common law, provides no direct insights. It seems safe to infer from the scarcity of
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Specifically, could individuals ever sue a state in federal court for
rights guaranteed by the superior (federal) sovereign? Because a
state defending an action in federal court would not be appearing
before its own tribunals, the dilemma does not raise the issue of
domestic sovereign immunity. Neither, however, is there a strict
analogy to foreign sovereign immunity-the situation where an
attempt was made to sue a foreign sovereign in the courts of
another, coequal sovereign. The supremacy clause' 7 clearly estab-
lished the national government as the supreme sovereign. There-
fore, the design of the Founding Fathers to extend sovereign
immunity protection to the states left unresolved the problem of
whether, absent consent, there would be any forum available for a
citizen to sue a state to vindicate a federally created right.1 8
material that the problems attendant to the transplant of sovereign immunity into the
federal organization of America were not anticipated by common law jurists.
17 U.S. CONST. art. VI.
"8 Mr. Justice Douglas once stated: "It is not uncommon for federal courts to fashion
federal law where federal rights are concerned .... There is no constitutional difficulty.
Article III, § 2, extends the judicial power to cases "arising under... the Laws of the United
States." Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957).
As the Justice would undoubtedly agree, the problem of providing a federal forum for
federally created rights is not so easy to solve when a state is the defendant. One stratagem
which has met with some success is a suit against a state officer. At common law, an
aggrieved subject could sue the King's officers for the monarch's acts on the theory that they
had given him bad advice. See Mathis, supra note 8, at 209. This approach was introduced
into the United States by the case of Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
251 (1824), where Chief Justice Marshall ruled that a state officer was suable for official acts
threatened or performed pursuant to an unconstitutional state statute. See C. JAcoBs, supra
note 8, at 97-103; Mathis, supra note 8, at 236.
In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887), has sometimes been called the most significant eleventh
amendment case to arise in the latter part of the last century. Involved in Ayers were coupons
issued by Virginia on which that state reneged. Ayers, the Attorney General of Virginia, had
begun litigation in his official capacity against persons who offered these coupons in
payment of taxes, despite a federal circuit court injunction forbidding commencement of
such an action. In finding the injunction invalid and acquitting Ayers of contempt, the
Supreme Court held that a state's breach of contract did not create personal liability in a
state official not a party to the contract. Cf. C. JAcoBs, supra note 8, at 128-31.
While rights claimed by citizens under the contract clause did not always fare well in
clashes with the eleventh amendment, individuals raising fourteenth amendment claims have
been more guccessful. In Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), stockholders of the Northern
Pacific Railway obtained a federal circuit court order restraining Young, the Attorney
General of Minnesota, from enforcing that state's purportedly confiscatory rate regulations.
Young disobeyed the order, was cited for contempt, and given over to the custody of a
United States marshall. He proceeded to petition the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas
corpus, asserting that the injunction was invalid under the eleventh amendment. The writ
was dismissed. Cf. C. JACOBS, supra note 8, at 138-42. The Ex parte Young doctrine has been
used in reapportionment and desegregation cases. See Mathis, supra note 8, at 243. Efforts to
raise an eleventh amendment defense in discrimination cases have been defeated on the
authority ofExparte Young. See Griffin v. School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218,
228 (1964).
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The wholesale transplanting of sovereign immunity doctrine
into the United States judicial system was not without turmoil. To
the dismay of many, the Supreme Court in Chisholm v. Georgia'9
ignored Hamilton's view and permitted a state to be sued by a
citizen of another state in the federal courts. Chisholm sued the
state of Georgia under the contract clause of the United States
Constitution for a debt contracted during the Revolution. When
the state refused to appear, the Supreme Court ordered judgment
to be entered against it.20 An outcry followed 2t and the eleventh
amendment was shortly thereafter adopted. It read:
Ex parte Young is frequently attacked on two grounds. The procedure of suing an official
rather than the government itself is called a "false pretense" or "empty fiction." See Block,
Suits Against Government Officers and the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 59 HARV. L. REv. 1060
(1946); Davis, Suing the Government by Falsely Pretending To Sue an Officer, 29 U. CHI. L. Rxv.
435 (1962). Also questioned is the obvious contradiction in finding the officer's acts
chargeable to him personally and thus not violative of the eleventh amendment while
holding those same acts to be state action for purposes of the fourteenth amendment. See
Mathis, supra note 8, at 242; Note, Sovereign Immunity in Suits To Enjoin the Enforcement of
Unconstitutional Legislation, 50 HARV. L. REv. 956 (1937). One cbmmentator decried the
decision as "illogical" and "rest[ing] on purest fiction" but yet states, "the doctrine of Ex
parte Young seems indispensable to the establishment of constitutional government and the
rule of law." C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 186 (2d ed. 1970). This
conclusion is satisfactory only if one accepts the premise that the fourteenth amendment
should not simply be held to be a limitation upon eleventh amendment sovereign immunity.
In the instant case it has been suggested that a suit solely against the officials of the
Missouri Department of Public Health and Welfare would fail:
The district court would be without jurisdiction in this situation under the
holding of Smith v. Reeves. [178 U.S. 436 (1900)]. In this case the plaintiff, in
attempting to recover money paid to the Treasurer of the State, sued the Trea-
surer. The state was not made a party to the suit. The issue was whether or not this
was in actuality a suit against the state. The Supreme Court said that although the
state was not a formal party to the suit, a judgment rendered against a state officer
in his official capacity, is in effect a judgment against the state since the judgment
must be satisfied from public funds.
Comment, Section 216 Fair Labor Standards Act-A Right Without a Remedy, 43 TEMP. L.Q. 269,
271-72 (1970). The author of this comment very perceptively foresaw the fact situation of
Department of Public Health. However, his analysis of the potential failure of a suit against the
officials of the Department relies upon a pre-Ex parte Young case. Had Department of Public
Health been grounded upon a fourteenth amendment right rather than on a congressionally
created statute, perhaps Ex parte Young would have justified barring the defense of sovereign
immunity.
19 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 16 (1793).
Chisholm has been called "the most celebrated case of the pre-Marshall period." C.
JACOBS, supra note 8, at 46. The plaintiff, Chisholm, was executor of the estate of one
Farquhar, and sued to collect on a contract between the latter and the State of Georgia for
war materiel bought during the Revolution. The action was dismissed by the United States
Circuit Court for the Georgia District. But, Chisholm, undaunted, went to the Supreme
Court to press his suit. Georgia refused to appear and judgment was entered against it. See
id. at 46-55.
20 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 69.
21 This opposition is commonly ascribed to state fears of suits by creditors. See M. IRISH
& J. PROTHRO, supra note 8, at 129; C. WARREN, supra note 8, at 99; Mathis, supra note 8, at
212. Contra, C. JACoBs, supra note 8, at 69-70.
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The Judicial power of the United States shall not be con-
strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. 22
After the passage of the eleventh amendment the question
arose whether it worked an absolute jurisdictional bar to suits like
Chisholm, as a literal reading would seem to indicate, or whether it
was meant to provide immunity to states from suits by citizens of
sister states only if a state would not consent to suit in federal court.
In 1883, the Supreme Court in Clark v. Barnard,23 held for the
latter position indicating that the state's immunity was a privilege it
could waive. In that instance, the state had voluntarily appeared in
the suit and was thus held to have consented to abandoning its
immunity.24 Six years later, the Supreme Court in Hans v.
Louisiana,2 5 was again called upon to decide a question not ex-
pressly covered by the eleventh amendment-whether a federal
court could hear a federal question case brought against a state by
one of its own citizens. Hans, a Louisiana resident, sued that state in
a United States circuit court to recover the value of coupons
annexed to bonds issued by the state legislature. The Supreme
Court concluded that to permit such a suit by a state's citizen while
forbidding it to residents of another state would be an anomaly. 26
Rhetorically, the Justices inquired:
22 U.S. CONsT. amend. XI.
23 108 U.S. 436 (1883).
24 Id. at 447-48. The Supreme Court has left no doubt that, unlike some other
jurisdictional bars, sovereign immunity may be waived by the state. "Immunity from suit
under the Eleventh Amendment is a personal privilege which may be waived." Missouri v.
Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 24 (1933). In Reagan v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 392
(1894), the restrictions imposed by the eleventh amendment were said to produce merely a
"personal privilege." The Court has found waiver by statute. See Ford Motor Co. v.
Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 468 (1945). However, the case of Murray v. Wilson
Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171 (1909), has been cited for the proposition that "[t]he
conclusion that there has been a waiver of immunity will not be lightly inferred." Petty v.
Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 276 (1959).
25 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
26 The Court stated:
[A]nd then we should have this anomalous result, that in cases arising under the
Constitution or laws of the United States, a State may be sued in the federal courts
by its own citizens, though it cannot be sued for a like cause of action by the citizens
of other States, or of a foreign state; and may be thus sued in the federal courts,
although not allowing itself to be sued in its own courts.
Id. at 10.
Such an "anomalous result" could have occurred in the instant case, absent Hans. That
is, Missouri citizens could have sued their state under the FLSA while residents of another
state, who were employed by the Department, would have been barred from suit. This fact
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Can we suppose that, when the Eleventh Amendment was
adopted, it was understood to be left open for citizens of a state
to sue their own state in the federal courts, whilst the idea of suits
by citizens of other states, or of foreign states, was indignantly
repelled?27
Though a state may consent to suit, if it refuses to do so, the
question remained as to whether the federal government had the
power by legislative fiat to compel it to submit to suit at the behest
of individual citizens. It is this issue which highlights the inherent
conflict between the policies shielding the state from suit and those
providing a federal forum for the vindication of federally created
rights. In both Maryland v. Wirtz, 28 which upheld the extension of
the Fair Labor Standards Act2 9 to cover certain state workers, and
California v. Taylor,30 where the Court ruled that a state owned and
operated carrier was subject to the Railway Labor Act, the question
was avoided by reserving to future decisions the issue of state
liability to suit by individuals under the respective statutes.3' While
the Court was willing to decide the validity of the federal legisla-
tion, it hesitated to enter further into the thicket by determining
whether the citizen was to have access to a federal forum to enforce
the rights provided by those statutes against a noncomplying state.
situation could quite possibly arise if the facility were located near a state border. See
Comment, supra note 18, at 271 n.16.
2 134 U.S. at 15. Much controversy surrounds the basis for the Court's holding. Some
would ground it in the eleventh amendment, others in article III, § 2 of the Constitution,
while still others argue forcefully that its theoretical justification is simply the common law.
See Comment, supra note 10, 33 U. CI. L. RFv. at 334; 17 ViLL. L. REv. 713, 716 (1972).
The Hans Court itself said:
It is not necessary that we should enter upon an examination of the reason or
expediency of the rule which exempts a sovereign State from prolecution in a court
ofjustice at the suit of individuals. This is fully discussed by writers on public law. It
is enough for us to declare its existence.
134 U.S. at 21.
The distinction between a common law basis and a constitutional foundation is not
simply one of scholarly interest. "If the immunity is based on the common law it may be
directly limited or even abrogated by judicial decision. If the immunity is constitutional,
however, judicial efforts to limit its application must be much more cautious." Comment,
supra note 10, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. at 334; see 411 U.S. at 312-15.
28 392 U.S. 183 (1968). Petitioners included 28 states and a school district.
29 Justices Douglas and Stewart dissented in the Maryland case. Mr. Justice Douglas
forcefully stated that "[in this case the State as a sovereign power is being seriously
tampered with, potentially crippled." Id. at 205.
30 353 U.S. 553 (1957). The Railway Labor Act is codified at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-64 (1970).
31 392 U.S. at 200; 353 U.S. at 568 n. 16. The Maryland Court stated that "questions of




IMPLIED WAIVER AND CONSENT
The devices chosen to circumvent Hans and the eleventh
amendment were the "fictions" of implied waiver and consent.32
The first case involving the use of these devices was Petty v.
Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commission.33 In Petty, an interstate com-
pact was the object of controversy rather than a federal law. In
consenting to the compact, Congress had attached a condition that
nothing therein would be construed to effect the power of the
federal courts over commerce.3 The compact also included a
sue-and-be-sued clause. Thus, the Court opined, "[Congress] ap-
proved a sue-and-be-sued clause in a compact under conditions
that made it clear that the States accepting it waived any immunity
from suit which they otherwise might have. 35
The only other Supreme Court case using the fiction of im-
plied consent and the case most closely in point with the Department
of Public Health is Parden v. Terminal Railway of the Alabama State
Docks Department.36 In Parden, an injured worker brought suit
under the Federal Employers Liability Act 37 against his employer, a
state owned and operated railroad. The statute made every inter-
state railroad liable to compensate workers for certain job-related
injuries.38 The Supreme Court posed two questions: "(1) Did
Congress in enacting the FELA intend to subject a State to suit in
these circumstances? (2) Did it have the power to do so, as against
the State's claim of immunity?" 39 Although the Court answered
both queries in the affirmative, it left the exact parameters of the
decision in some doubt. As to intent, the Court reasoned that to
32 17 VILL. L. REv. 713, 721 (1972). For a discussion of the judicial use of these devices,
see Cullison, supra note 8; Note, supra note' 10, 69 DICK. L. REv. at 270; Comment, Sovereign
Immunity and the Fair Labor Standards Act, 21 J. PUB. L. 415, 420-26 (1972); Comment, supra
note 10, 33 U. CH. L. Rzv. at 331.
33 359 U.S. 275 (1959). The plaintiff was the widow of an employee of the agency
created by the compact who was killed while working on an agency-owned ferryboat.
The case is examined in depth in 45 IowA L. REv. 621 (1960) and 6 WAYNE L. REv. 253
(1960).
34 359 U.S. at 277-78.
35 Id. at 280.
36 377 U.S. 184 (1964); see Note, supra note 10, 69 DICK. L. REV. at 270. Another
treatment of the case, at the United States court of appeals level in a decision later reversed
by the Supreme Court, may be found at 49 VA. L. REV. 604 (1963).
37 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as FELA].
38 The statute extends coverage to "[e]very common carrier by railroad" engaged in
interstate and therefore congressionally regulated commerce. Id. § 51.
39 377 U.S. at 187.
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interpret the law as permitting the state to take advantage of
governmental immunity would leave the injured employee with a
hollow right, lacking a remedy-a result that Congress could not
possibly have intended.40 The Court also emphasized the propri-
etary nature of the state's activity and pointed to the fact that the
conduct-interstate commerce-was subject to federal government
regulation. The Court concluded that
[t]o preclude this form of regulation in all cases of state activity
would remove an important weapon from the congressional
arsenal with respect to a substantial volume of regulable conduct.
Where, as here, Congress by the terms and purposes of its
enactment has given no indication that it desires to be thus
hindered in the exercise of its constitutional power, we see
nothing in the Constitution to obstruct its will. 4'
Thus, the Court indicated that Congress must affirmatively state a
disinclination to subject the states to suit, or they will be so sub-
jected. That is, silence will be interpreted as intent to strip the
states of their sovereign immunity.
After finding congressional intent, the five-four majority
stated:
By empowering Congress to regulate commerce, then, the States
necessarily surrendered any portion of their sovereignty that
would stand in the way of such regulation. Since imposition of
the FELA right of action upon interstate railroads is within the
congressional regulatory power, it must follow that application of
the Act to such a railroad cannot be precluded by sovereign
immunity.42
40 The Court stated:
To read a "sovereign immunity exception" into the Act would result, moreover, in a
right without a remedy; it would mean that Congress made "every" interstate
railroad liable in damages to injured employees but left one class of such em-
ployees-those whose employers happen to be state owned-without any effective
means of enforcing that liability. We are unwilling to conclude that Congress
intended so pointless and frustrating a result. We therefore read the FELA as
authorizing suit in a Federal District Court against state-owned as well as privately
owned common carriers by railroad in interstate commerce.
Id. at 190.
41 Id. at 198.
42 Id. at 192. It has been suggested that the Court is exaggerating the scope of the
commerce power.
The Court fails ... to reconcile this power of Congress to regulate interstate
commerce with a state's constitutional immunity from suit by an individual in a
federal court. Although Congress' power to regulate commerce is complete and
plenary, it is not absolute. It is subject to the limitations and guarantees of the
Constitution. Among these limitations are those providing that the people shall be
secure against unreasonable searches and seizures, that private property may not be
taken without just compensation. ... It is submitted that the eleventh amendment,
as supplemented by Hans, is another limitation guaranteed by the Constitution.
Note, supra note 10, 69 DICK. L. REv. at 280.
1974]
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Additionally, however, the Court argued that the state had
consented to suit by entering the business of operating the carrier
after Congress had enacted the FELA. Perhaps seeking to allay the
fears of staunch states rightists, Mr. Justice Brennan stated reassur-
ingly:
Recognition of the congressional power to render a State
suable under the FELA does -not mean that the immunity doc-
trine, as embodied in the Eleventh Amendment with respect to
citizens of other States and as extended to the State's own citizens
by the Hans case, is here being overridden. It remains the law
that a State may not be sued by an individual without its consent.
Our conclusion is simply that Alabama, when it began operation
of an interstate railroad approximately 20 years after enactment
of the FELA, necessarily consented to such suit as was authorized
by that Act. 43
This emphasis on the state's waiver through entrance into the
regulated activity seems to conflict with the contention that, in
entering the Union, the states surrendered some portion of their
immunity through the commerce clause. This seemingly
superfluous double waiver created some uncertainty as to the scope
of Congress' power to deny the sovereign immunity defense.
Under one view the state waived its immunity in the inter-
state commerce area upon entering the Union. Under the
majority's second statement, however, it would appear that the
waiver occurred when the state entered into an area of commerce
previously regulated by the Congress. Under the latter view the
question of the immunity of a state which first entered into an
unregulated area which later -became regulated would be open. On
the issue of intent, however, the dissent split with the Court,
declaring: "Only when Congress has clearly considered the prob-
lem and expressly declared that any State which undertakes given
regulable conduct will be deemed thereby to have waived its
iimunity should courts disallow the invocation of this defense."'4 4
The dissenting Justices were loath to construe the word "every" in
the applicability portion of the statute as having the broad implica-
tions of congressional intent their brethren discerned.
43 377 U.S. at 192. If this statement was an effort to pacify -defenders of state
sovereignty it may have been more of a concession than Mr. Justice Brennan realized. It
places an emphasis on the time element, the moment at which the state entered the business
in relation to the point at which the statute went into effect. For, if the state is to be held to
have consented to suit, it must have had legal notice that the regulation existed or consent
becomes meaningless. This implication seems to limit the other statement in the opinion;
that in granting Congress regulatory powers in the commerce clause, the states "surrendered
any portion of their sovereignty that would stand in the way of such regulation." Id.
44 Id. at 198-99 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
III
THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
The Fair Labor Standards Act 45 was enacted in 1938 in the
hope that it would ensure a decent minimum standard of living for
those American workers who could be reached by Congress' power
to regulate interstate commerce. 46 As originally promulgated, the
Act exempted state government employers from coverage. In
1966, the statute was broadened.47 Congress amended the Act to
include the enterprise concept of coverage and to extend wage and
hour protection to employees of hospitals and related facilities
whether or not such institutions were publicly or privately operated.4' The
FLSA provides for recovery in event of breach in the amount of
unpaid compensation plus liquidated damages, authorizing private
suit by the aggrieved employee against his employer in any court of
competent jurisdiction.49  In Wirtz, the validity of these
45 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 1, 52 Stat. 1060.
46 As expressed in 1965 by then Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz:
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 was a commitment to improve living
standards by eliminating substandard working conditions in employment subject to
Federal authority over interstate commerce. That commitment, incomplete when it
was made, has become less complete with the passage of time. The law has not been
kept in line with the advancing economy; and some of its guarantees mean less,
comparatively, than they did 27 years ago.
1966 U.S.C.C. & A.N. 3003.
47 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1970).
The amendments are discussed and analyzed in Stettbacher, Analysis of 1966 Amendments
to the Fair Labor Standards Act, 46 MICH. ST. B.J. 21 (April 1967).
48 The statutory provision which extended coverage to state workers provides:
. . . "Enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce" means an enterprise which has employees engaged in commerce or in
the production of goods for commerce, including employees handling, selling, or
otherwise working on goods that have been moved in or produced for commerce by
any person, and which-
is engaged in the operation of a hospital, an institution primarily engaged
in the care of the sick, the aged, the 'mentally ill or defective who reside on the
premises of such institution, a school for mentally or physically handicapped or
gifted children, a preschool, an elementary or secondary school, or an institution of
higher education (regardless of whether or not such hospital, institution, or school is public
or private or operated for profit or not for profit).
29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(4) (Supp. 11 1972) (emphasis added).
The enterprise concept of coverage is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 203(s) (1970). As explained
by Stettbacher:
Congress sought to minimize the fragmentation of coverage resulting from
individual involvement in commerce by introducing the "enterprise" concept of
coverage. Under the enterprise concept the employee is covered, if in any given
work-week, he is engaged in commerce or in production of goods for commerce or
in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in production of goods for commerce.
Stettbacher, supra note 47, at 22.
49 Any employer who violates the provisions of section 206 or section 207
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modifications was upheld as a proper exercise by Congress of its
regulatory powers under the commerce clause, although as in
Taylor, the Court left open the question of state liability to suit.50
In terms of congressional intent and power, the FLSA pre-
sented a problem similar to that of the FELA in Parden. Although
the legislators did not make absolutely explicit their desire to
render the states amenable to suit, their intent seemed clearer than
that which the Supreme Court held sufficient in Parden. The FELA
simply made every interstate railroad liable; this was held to include
state owned carriers. 5' However, in section 203 of the FLSA
Congress amended the statutory definition of employer to ex-
plicitly include certain categories of state management.52 In section
216b, the portion of the law covering liability and damages was not
altered; it continued to read that "[a]ny employer . . . shall be
liable. '53 However, since "employer" had been amended in the
definitional section to include state management, it is questionable
that any change was necessary. Further, in light of Parden, silence
was to be interpreted as intent to bar sovereign immunity
protection.54
Parden was thought to be controlling by the Tenth Circuit
when it decided the case of Briggs v. Sagers,55 the facts of which
closely resemble those of Department of Public Health. In Briggs, Utah
citizens employed at a state owned facility for the mentally deficient
brought an action under the FLSA. The court recognized that
"[t]he inevitable confrontation squares the power of Congress to
regulate interstate commerce under the commerce clause against
the Eleventh Amendment right of the states to be free from federal
court suit, absent consent."56 However, the tribunal concluded that
by continuing to maintain the institution after the federal statutory
amendments were effective, the state waived its immunity and
of this title shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of
their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation as the case
may be, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. Action to recover
such liability may be maintained in any court of competent jurisdiction by any one
or more employees.
29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970).
50 See notes 28-31 and accompanying text supra.
51 353 U.S. 553 (1957).
52 29 U.S.C. § 203 (1970).
53 Id. § 216(b).
5' See note 41 and accompanying text supra.
55 424 F.2d 130 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 829 (1970). Briggs is discussed and
compared with Department of Public Health at the court of appeals level in Comment, supra
note 32, 21 J. PuB. L. at 424-31.
56 424 F.2d at 131-32.
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consented to suit.57 In answer to the argument that Parden did not
apply because the state had entered the activity prior to the
amendments and mere continuation could not be read as consent,
the court responded:
[W]e think the express intent of Congress and the language of
Parden must control the matter. The regulatory power of Con-
gress, although limited to constitutionally defined matters, e.g.,
interstate commerce, is plenary as to those matters. Since the
FLSA was enacted through the authority of the Commerce
Clause, and inasmuch as the right of action imposed by the FLSA
is fully within the congressional regulatory power, it would be
incongruous to deny Congress the power to name a prompt,
effective date for such amendments.58
Thus, the Tenth Circuit found both congressional intent to subject
the states to suit as well as the power to do so.
IV
Department of Public Health
Like their Utah counterparts, the employees of the Missouri
Department of Public Health and Welfare sought relief under the
Fair Labor Standards Act. The Eighth Circuit came out strongly in
support of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, asserting that the
eleventh amendment, as a more recent enactment, took prec-
edence over the commerce clause. 59 Recognizing the necessity to
distinguish Parden, it pointed to the time factor, emphasizing that
there, the state had entered the activity after enactment of the
statute while in the instant case the amendments followed the
state's entrance.6 0 The tribunal also stressed the nature of the
operation, stating that running a railroad is proprietary while
maintaining a hospital is a governmental function.6 '
Mr. Justice Douglas, author of the Supreme Court opinion,
stressed the question of congressional intent, declaring that "[t]he
question is whether Congress has brought the States to heel, in the
sense of lifting their immunity from suit in a federal court."62
Noting the governmental-proprietary distinction, he observed that
although Parden involved a fairly unique situation, the Missouri
57 The court did not regard the time element as crucial. Id. at 134.
58 Id. at 133.
59 452 F.2d at 825.
60 Id. at 827.
61 Id.
62 411 U.S. at 283.
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case represented a common practice, and its ramifications would
affect numerous employees in state health facilities throughout the
nation. 63 In addition, recovery under the FLSA could include
double damages which would drain a state treasury. Mr. Justice
Douglas asserted that Congress would not have intended the im-
position of such a burden merely by implication. 64 The wronged
employees, he concluded, were left to rely upon the Secretary of
Labor or upon a possible suit in state court. 65 The crux of the
Court's argument was an interpretation of the FLSA; it could find
no indication in the enactment that Congress, in amending it,
planned to deprive the states of their immunity. Although in 1966
the definition of employer had been altered, the remedial portion
of the statute had been left untouched, with no explicit provision
made for suits against governmental employers. Concluding that
the statute was silent on the crucial issue of intent, the Court
decided that the state could take refuge in the protection of
sovereign immunity.66 This construction essentially ignores the
closing lines of Parden, which inferred intent from silence, and
instead adopts the Parden dissent. 67 In so doing, the Court effec-
tively limited Parden to cases where Congress has explicitly ex-
pressed its desire to bar the defense.
The concurring Justices, Marshall and Stewart, adopted a
different approach. Modifying the Parden queries, they first ques-
tioned Congress' intent and then inquired not as to Congress'
power, but as to that of the federal courts to hear sucl a suit:
[D]id Congress, in extending the protection of the FLSA to state
employees such as these petitioners, effectively lift the State's
protective veil of sovereign immunity; and ... even if Congress
did lift the State's general immunity, is the exercise of federaljudicial power barred in the context of this case in light of Art.
III and the Eleventh Amendment?68
The concurring Justices ignored the majority's strained statutory
63 Id. at 284-85.
The governmental-proprietary distinction has been used by other courts to settle
questions of sovereign immunity. Basically, it holds the state liable to suit if the cause of
action arises from activities traditionally engaged in by private individuals while it allows the
defense of immunity when the state is performing governmental functions. The distinction
is mentioned in Note, supra note 10, 69 DICK. L. REv. at 282-83.
64 411 U.S. at 286.
65 Id. Mr. Justice Douglas does not deal with the probable immunity bar the plaintiffs
would encounter in attempting to bring their suit in state court.
66 Id. at 285.
61 See notes 41 & 44 and accompanying text supra.
68 411 U.S. at 287-88.
[Vol. 59:709
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
interpretation and answered yes to their first question, deciding
that undoubtedly Congress did plan to bar the immunity defense.69
As to the problem of congressional power, they pointed to the
Parden statement that in entering the Union and conferring reg-
ulatory powers upon the Congress under the commerce clause, the
states surrendered a part of their immunity. 70 However, they
decided that the time factor in Parden justified the court in using
the device of implied consent. In their view the eleventh amend-
ment created a jurisdictional bar; therefore, the federal courts
lacked the power to hear the instant case, absent the state's consent.
Instead, the disgruntled employees would be relegated to suit in a
Missouri state court which would be bound to hear the case because
Congress had stripped the states of their immunity from suits in
their own courts.7 1
Echoing the Eighth Circuit, Mr. Justice Marshall distin-
guished Parden on essentially a single ground; the state in that case
entered the railroad business after the enactment of the FELA
while here Missouri had been operating its hospitals and homes for
years prior to the FLSA amendments. Thus, consent could not be
inferred in the latter instance as it would be absurd to suggest that
the state abandon its facilities or become subject to suit.72 Justice
Marshall announced:
For me at least, the concept of implied consent or waiver
relied upon in Parden approaches, on the facts of that case, the
outer limits of the sort of voluntary choice which we generally
associate with the concept of constitutional waiver.7 3
Pointing to article III of the Constitution, the concurrence
notes that
[b]ecause of the problems of federalism inherent in making one
sovereign appear against its will in the courts of the other, a
restriction upon the exercise of the federal judicial power has
long been considered to be appropriate in a case such as this.7 4
Owing to this jurisdictional limitation, the state court was the
appropriate forum. Although recognizing that it might well appear
a "hypertechnicality" to insist that the petitioners could enforce
federal rights against their state in a state forum but not a federal
69 Id. at 289-90.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 297-98.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 296.
74 Id. at 294.
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court, Mr. Justice Marshall still asserted, "I think it is a hypertech-
nicality that has long been understood to be a part of the tension
inherent in our system of federalism. 7 5
The lone dissenter, Mr. Justice Brennan, who had written the
Court's opinion in Parden, believed that case to be dispositive as to
both intent and power.7 6 He also rejected the Court's claim that
Congress did not plainly intend to subject the states to suit in
federal court under the FLSA.7 7 He denied the significance of the
distinction between an enterprise commonly government operated
and one ordinarily run by private firms and pointed out the
ineffectiveness of leaving the workers to any other remedy.7 8 He
agreed with the Briggs court that Congress believed the value of the
FLSA exceeded any possible fiscal disadvantage to the states:
"[T]he overall purpose of the FLSA tacitly suggests that the imposi-
tion of such strain is outweighed by the underlying policy of the
Act."79
In discussing the Parden holding which he admitted was,
"perhaps not unambiguously phrased,"80 Mr. Justice Brennan
stressed the portion of that decision which asserted that the states,
in granting the commerce power to Congress, surrendered a part
of their sovereign immunity.81 He did not give weight to the
distinction between Parden and the case at hand as to the time of
entrance into the regulated activity.82 Much of the dissent is a
vigorous attack upon the concurrence's use of sovereign immunity
buttressed by the eleventh amendment to constitutionally preclude
federal court suit against a state by its citizens. Mr. Justice Brennan
admonished his bretheren for halting "the trend toward limitation
of the defense of governmental immunity,"83 and expressed con-
75 Id. at 298. This phrase is particularly insightful. The case is filled with a sense of
"the tension inherent in our system of federalism," since it represents a recurring and
complex conflict.
76 Mr. Justice Brennan said: "[T]he lawsuits have in common that each is an action for
damages in federal court brought against a State by citizens of the State in its employ under
the authority of a regulatory statute founded on the Commerce Clause." Id. at 299.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 303-08. Mr. Justice Brennan had strong support for his contention that other
remedies were inadequate in the amicus curiae brief of the Solicitor General. Id. at 305.
79 424 F.2d at 134. The Briggs court purports to rely upon the legislative history of the
FLSA but essentially draws its own conclusions from what is basically a blank slate.
80 411 U.S. at 301.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 301-02. Here, Mr. Justice Brennan encounters problems created by his own
phrasing in the Parden opinion. See note 43 supra.
83 411 U.S. at 323. It was this trend which led many commentators to believe that
sovereign immunity was no longer a viable doctrine. It was apparently expected, after the
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cern that, even if Congress' intent had been plainly stated, the
Court would have ba-'red the suit.
This fear seems unfounded. Mr. Justice Douglas strongly
suggests the opposite in stating that
[w]e decline to extend Parden to cover every exercise by Congress
of its commerce power, where the purpose of Congress to give
force to the Supremacy Clause by lifting the sovereignty of the
States and putting the States on the same footing as other
employers is not clear.8 4
The majority seems convinced that Congress does possess the power
to "[bring] the States to heel."8 5 However, as intent is the focus of
the Court's discussion, it is difficult to draw this conclusion with
certainty. What the Court will do when faced with a statute where
the legislature's intent is explicit and unambiguous is an open
question.
CONCLUSION
Surely the Court has given new life to the concept of state
sovereign immunity. Perhaps in the case at bar it has also ren-
dered meaningless rights guaranteed working people by Congress.
As Mr. Justice Douglas correctly observed, the pivotal issue of
the case is whether Parden can be distinguished. s His effort to
do so is not wholly satisfactory. 7 Congress' intent to bar the
holding in Parden, that the doctrine might soon be disclaimed entirely. This thought was
expressed in one examination of Department of Public Health at the Eighth Circuit level. The
writer apparently did not anticipate that the Supreme Court might affirm the decision
below, when he said:
Whatever method is eventually used by the Supreme Court to shed the traditional
sovereign immunity doctrine, developed in earlier days when state sovereign
immunity was not a tremendous inconvenience, it appears that the needs of our
times require that it be done. However valid sovereign immunity once was, and
however disciplined the Eighth Circuit's refusal to accept a fictional waiver theory
may be, the instant case is but a temporary halt to the continued erosion of state
sovereign immunity.
17 Viu.. L. REv. 713, 722 (1972).
84 411 U.S. at 286-87.
Is Id. at 283.
86 Id. at 281..
87 Id. at 282-87. Mr. Justice Douglas suggests that the employees look to the Secretary
of Labor for vindication of their rights. Yet the Secretary cannot annually investigate more
than four percent of the enterprises covered by the FLSA. See Hodgson v. Ricky Fashions,
Inc., 434 F.2d 1261, 1263 n.2 (5th Cir. 1970).
Additionally, the spectre of double damages is essentially a fantasy since under the
statute a showing of good faith obviates their imposition, and in any case, the matter is
within the discretion of the judge. In all likelihood, a state would be afforded escape. The
following is the applicable FLSA provision:
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sovereign immunity defense under the FELA is less clearly indi-
cated than its desire to do so under the FLSA.8 s It has been
suggested that while Congress definitely wanted to extend coverage
to state employees, the procedural problems attendant to state
sovereignty never entered into their thinking.8 9 Earlier in this
century, the Court, referring to the presumption that a sovereign is
not bound by its own law unless expressly mentioned therein,
stated:
We can perceive no reason for extending [the presumption] so as
to exempt a business carried on by a state from the otherwise
applicable provisions of an act of Congress, all-embracing in
scope and national in its purpose, which is as capable of being
obstructed by state as by individual action.90
By emphasizing the question of intent and then finding it
lacking, the Court has side-stepped some significant issues. It is as
yet not clear whether Parden held that in enacting a regulatory
statute Congress lifted the immunity defense or whether the time
factor of entrance into the controlled activity is the crucial element.
As matters now stand, it appears that were congressional intent
clear, the Court would hold a state amenable to suit. We shall have
In any action commenced prior to or on or after May 14, 1947 to recover
unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime compensation, or liquidated damages,
under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, if the employer shows to
the satisfaction of the court that the act or omission giving rise to such action was in
good faith and that he had reasonable grounds for believing that his act or omission
was not a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, the court
may, in its sound discretion, award no liquidated damages or award any amount
thereof not to exceed the amount specified in section 216(b) of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 260 (1970); see 17 ViLL. L. REv. 713, 719 & n.48 (1972).
Most strikingly, the Court's comment that the case's ramifications would touch countless
state employees is counterproductive; it is precisely this large mass of persons who need the
full protection of such social welfare legislation. Id. at 720-21.
88 As Mr. Justice Brennan points out, the statutory wording in the FELA is even more
vague since it makes no express provision covering state railroad employees. 411 U.S. at 302.
The FELA statute is quoted in part at note 38 supra.
89 Comment, supra note 18, at 274.
The author of the above Comment suggests that the problem presented by this case
could be solved through unionization of state workers who could then bargain with their
employer on an equal footing.
90 United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 186 (1936). The Court was called upon to
decide whether or not the Federal Safety Appliance Act (45 U.S.C. § 286 (1970)) applied to
the State Belt Railroad which was owned and operated by the State of California. It
concluded that it did, stating:
The suggestion that it should be assumed that Congress did not intend to subject a
sovereign state to the inconvenience and loss of dignity involved in a trial in a
district court is not persuasive when weighed against the complete appropriateness
of the court and venue selected for the trial of issues growing out of the particular
activity in which the state has chosen to engage.
297 U.S. at 188-89.
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to wait for a later case which does not present the Court with an
intent loophole before we can discover sovereign immunity's next
fate.91
Catherine J. Minuse
91 The decision in the instant case involved the commerce clause. What is its potential
impact on other provisions of the Constitution? Referring to the notion that in granting the
commerce power the states waived that part of their immunity which conflicted with the
conferred authority, one commentator has stated:
[U]nder this analysis there is no sound basis for distinguishing the commerce power
from any of the other enumerated powers [which he lists as taxing, postal,
bankruptcy, and certain military powers]. Because of the expansive reading given to
the commerce clause, however, conflicts involving this particular power are likely to
be more frequent. Moreover, where the commerce power is involved, it will also be
easier for the courts to imply an intent on the part of Congress to subject the states
to suit since courts have traditionally given federal commerce legislation the
broadest construction.
Note, Waiver of State Immunity: Private Damage Actions Against the States Arising Under Federal
Law, 50 B.U.L. REv. 590, 603 (1970). As Department of Public Health indicates, tradition is not
an unfailing guide to the future behavior of the Court.
